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Abstract: 
Consider the story of Harry Fischel, fired from his job in the 19th Century for not 
compromising his religious practice when it came into conflict with his professional responsibilities.  
Fast forward two centuries and consider Henry Asher, terminated as well, under strikingly similar 
circumstances.  Has anything changed?  This piece examines the effectiveness of current religious 
protection laws in the United States workplace.  Toward this end, the author presents a framework 
through which to understand Title VII, its history, and its purposes.  The author then identifies a 
perplexing problem by which certain classes of citizens are disproportionally favored over others under 
the current state of the law.  This disproportion problem is self-perpetuating in that those groups 
negatively impacted are those least equipped to rectify their situation through political means.  
Culminating with a survey of academic treatment of the topic, as well as a hopeful eye toward the 
future, this piece presents important observations affecting millions of Americans each day, 
particularly those in low-income professions and classes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the story of Harry Fischel (1865-1948),1 a Russian immigrant who 
arrived in the United States during the turn of the 20th century.  After several weeks 
of searching for employment, Fischel finally found a job with an architecture firm.2  
On his first Friday, Fischel requested Saturday off for religious reasons, so he could 
observe his Sabbath.3  Not only was his request denied, but the firm issued the 
following ultimatum: either work Saturday or face termination. 4   Fischel was 
unemployed the following Monday morning.5 
Consider the story of Henry Asher over a century later.6  Asher was a bus 
driver for the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(―MTA‖).7  MTA policy requires a bus operator to remain available on weekends for 
all shifts and locations. 8   Contrary to the policy, Asher requested time off on 
                                                 
1 Harry Fischel‘s story is related in JONATHAN D. SARNA, AMERICAN JUDAISM 163 (Yale University 
Press) (2004). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Related from author‘s personal knowledge.  See also Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice 
Department Settles Lawsuit Alleging Religious Discrimination by The LA Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/pr/2005/October/05_crt_534.html; Complaint filed in Asher‘s case, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/emp/documents/LAMTAcomp.htm; Settlement Agreement available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/emp/documents/LMTACD.htm. 
7
 See Press Release, supra note 6. 
8
 See id. 
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weekends in observance of his religious Sabbath. 9   Asher‘s employer denied his 
request and fired Asher for missing work.10 
The stories of Harry Fischel and Henry Asher, and the choices each faced, 
mirror the experiences of a faceless multitude of employees.  Regardless of the 
historic period, nation of origin, religious faith, race, or social class, employees 
confront the harsh choice: either abandon your religious practice or give up your job. 
While recognizing that this harsh reality once existed in the world of 
employment, we typically associate it with times long in the past.  The past has passed, 
we muse.  Surely things are better now.  In some ways, this notion may be true, but 
in other ways the struggles of the past persist.  Even today employees fight that same 
persistent struggle.  Has much changed since Harry Fischel‘s firing from his job for 
observing the Sabbath at the turn of the 20th Century?  In light of Henry Asher‘s 
termination from his job for observing the Sabbath at the turn of the 21st Century, it 
would seem that little has changed. 
Must Asher and others today endure the same punishment for remaining 
loyal to their religious beliefs?  This article recounts the history of, and examines the 
tools that protect, employees from such treatment.  In theory, these tools empower 
employees to fight back within the structure of the legal system.  But how successful 
are these half-century safeguards?  The following article explores this question and 
examines whether employees are truly free to practice their religion without fear of 
reprisal in the workplace.  This article will show that these age-old struggles persist in 
earnest for certain segments of society. 
This article begins by presenting the historical background of religious 
accommodation in the United States workplace.  It examines current law and 
advancements in the area of religious accommodation.  It will then identify serious 
pitfalls arising from current policy.  Broadly speaking, the pitfalls have threatened to 
turn back the clock, leaving segments of society at risk.  Specifically, a two-prong 
disproportion problem unfairly favors employers over employees and professionals over 
hourly wage earners, leaving the workforce vulnerable to religious intolerance.  Next, 
the article proposes solutions to these problems.  The final section analyzes the legal 
academic treatment of the topic to date. 
                                                 
9 See id. 
10 See Press Release, supra note 6.  The Department of Justice ultimately filed suit on Asher‘s behalf in 
2004, the results of which will be related in the article‘s conclusion. 
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II. WHERE THE MOVEMENT WENT RIGHT: THE BEGINNINGS OF 
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN THE WORKPLACE,                                   
AND THE PROGRESS GAINED11 
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, barring 
religious discrimination in the workplace. 12   The language of the statute states 
unequivocally that ―[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . . religion.‖13  Prior to the 
enactment of Title VII, a safeguard for employees did not exist.14  As drafted, Title 
                                                 
11 Before proceeding, it is necessary to first ask the question: what is religion?  Courts have reached no 
clear consensus, but have proffered varying definitions throughout U.S. history.  This difficulty in 
articulating one universal definition of religion may be due to the fact that any definition necessarily 
manifests the articulator‘s own religious, political, and personal outlook.  Who is to say that a Supreme 
Court Justice is in any better position to offer such a definition than a clergyman, an atheist, or anyone 
in between?  In the 1931 Supreme Court decision United States v. Macintosh, Chief Justice Hughes 
articulated that ―[t]he essence of religion . . . [as a] belief in a relation to God involving duties superior 
to those arising from any human relation.‖ 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (Hughes, J., dissenting).  In contrast, 
in the 1970 decision Welsh v. United States, the Supreme Court denoted that a religion need not even 
encompass a belief in a supreme being, but ―[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that 
are purely ethical or moral in source and content . . . those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that 
individual ‗a place parallel to that filled by God‘ in traditionally religious persons.‖ 398 U.S. 333, 340.  
As an indicator to the complexity involved in defining religion, an American Bar Association Manual 
on topic has devoted an entire chapter to the question addressing ―How Is Religion Defined?‖  See 
MICHAEL WOLF ET AL., RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 28 (1998). 
12 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006) (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which did not alter the 
language of the original draft), with Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
14 The fact that Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and specifically drafted language 
providing for protection from religious discrimination in the workplace, indicates that such safeguards 
were necessary and previously lacking.  It is true that the Constitution of the United States itself 
provides safeguards in some form to religious discrimination.  The First Amendment provides that 
―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.‖  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The latter section is the Free Exercise Clause, while the former is the 
Establishment Clause.  The First Amendment generally restricts those acting on behalf of the 
government, and thus is relevant to a discussion of religious protection in the public sector.  As the 
focus of this article is on private employers, the protections provided by the First Amendment are 
beyond the scope of this article.  See Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(―In most of the cases alleging religious discrimination under Title VII, the employer is a private entity 
rather than a government, and the first amendment to the Constitution is therefore not applicable to 
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VII applied to all private employers who ―engaged in an industry affecting commerce 
[and having] twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of twenty 
or more calendar weeks [per year].‖15  In 1972, the Act reduced the requisite number 
of employees to 15, further broadening the pool of employers under regulation.16  As 
such, from its inception, Title VII applied to most employers in the private sector, 
with only the smallest firms escaping its reach. 
In attempting to secure religious freedom, Title VII sought to regulate a 
broad spectrum of employment activities.17  Title VII prevented employers from 
―fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge . . . or otherwise to discriminate‖ 
against an employee due to the employee‘s religion. 18   Furthermore, the law 
prohibited an employer from ―limit[ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing] his employees 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual‘s . . . religion.‖19  These safeguards remain firmly in place within 
today‘s current version of Title VII.20 
The passage of Title VII represented a major victory for employee rights in 
the United States.  For the first time, employees had a mode of recourse for religious 
discrimination by employers.  Yet, what did employees really win?  A legal duty upon 
employers to merely desist from discriminating is far less compelling than would be a 
requirement on them to actively accommodate.  To what degree, if at all, could this 
abstract religious protection receive application in real life? 
Aside from refraining to discriminate, were employers bound in any way to 
extend themselves or their businesses to actively accommodate religion under the 
new laws?  The ensuing Title VII case law would answer in the affirmative, as the 
                                                                                                                                     
the employment relationship.‖) (citing Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1492 n.5 (10th Cir. 
1989)). 
15 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
16 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 701(b), 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
17 For purposes of this article, ―Title VII‖ will be used hereafter as referring to the sections of the 
statute specific to religious accommodation in the workplace. 
18 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1). 
19 Id. at § 703(a)(2). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2006). 
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history of the movement would play itself out.21  In declaring that employers indeed 
held an affirmative duty to accommodate, the movement for religious 
accommodation in the workplace achieved its most significant victory.22 
As initially drafted, the preliminary section of Title VII defined many of the 
terms used in the statute, such as person, employer, employment agency, and more.23  What 
was not defined, however, was the all-important but extremely contentious term 
religion.24  The omission may be conceivably explained by the fact that a universal 
definition of religion does not exist.  Whatever the reason, from the beginning of the 
movement, interpreting this term was left to employers or courts on a case-by-case 
basis.  However, in 1972, Congress recognized that ―[d]espite the commitment . . . to 
the goal of equal employment opportunity for all our citizens, the machinery created 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [was] [in]adequate.‖25  Therefore, Congress embarked 
on amending its laws and enforcement procedures.  One such amendment, while 
falling short of proffering an actual definition, sought to shed more light on this 
question of what religion is: ―[t]he term ‗religion‘ includes all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is 
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee‘s or prospective employee‘s 
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer‘s business.‖26 
As demonstrated, this new definition asserts an affirmative duty upon 
employers to accommodate religion in the workplace where previously there was 
none. 27   The language ―unless an employer demonstrates . . . undue hardship‖ 
conveys that for want of such hardship, an employer holds a duty to ―reasonably 
accommodate.‖28  Thus, the burden of proof shifts to an employer once an employee 
                                                 
21 See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
22 See id. 
23 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(a)-(i). 
24 See supra note 11. 
25 H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 2139 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2139. 
26 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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asserts a need for accommodation. 29   In addition, the amendment codified an 
extremely broad definition of religion – ―all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief‖ – which was absent in the prior statute.30 
This affirmative duty placed on employers to accommodate religion in the 
workplace represented a great victory for employees.  No longer, it seemed, would 
employees operate in fear of asserting religious rights at the mercy of potentially 
biased employers or biased terms of employment.  Eliminating the fear of religious 
discrimination, Title VII had finally given U.S. employees a voice in the realm of 
religion in the workplace.  But how loud was that voice? 
The true test of laws is ultimately their effectiveness and enforceability when 
applied to everyday situations, to real life.  Questions of applicability of laws in this 
manner are decided by the courts.  In the years following the 1972 amendments to 
Title VII, the victory achieved by employees in the workplace was affirmed in a 
number of significant ways.  First, courts began to broadly interpret the definition of 
religion.  The definition of religion first codified in 1972 has been interpreted by 
courts since then to include everything from major to obscure religions, and even as 
far as self-proclaimed religions where the harmed party is the sole adherent.31  The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (―EEOC‖) followed suit in its 
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, noting ―[t]he fact that no religious group 
                                                 
29  In Section III, this article will explore the contentious language ―undue hardship,‖ which has 
become the subject of considerable case law. 
30 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 2(7). 
31 See e.g., WOLF, supra note 11, at 30 (―Someone who is the sole adherent to a particular religious 
dogma may still be protected.‖); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707 (1981) (―The determination of what is a ‗religious‘ belief or practice is more often than not a 
difficult and delicate task . . . [h]owever, the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial 
perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, 
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.‖); 
Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2000) (―[S]elf-proclaimed adherent of the ‗Hebrew religion, but 
not ascribing to any organized religion . . .  is entitled to protection.‖); Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294 
(9th Cir. 1979) (declining to decide whether or not the Universal Life Church (UCL), which espoused 
―no traditional doctrine . . . [but only] belie[f] in that which is RIGHT,‖ constituted protected religion); 
In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112 (R.I. 1978) (protecting right of orthodox Sunni Muslim to wear ―prayer 
cap‖ in court); State v. Hodges, 695 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn. 1985) (affirming remand to trial court which 
failed to adequately inquire into the religious belief, and thereby erroneously held in contempt, 
defendant who appeared in court dressed ―like a chicken,‖ and asserted before the trial court, ―[t]his is 
a spiritual attire and it is my religious belief . . . .). 
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espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual 
professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the belief 
is a religious belief.‖32  Notably, even prior to the adoption of the amendments to 
Title VII, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Seeger that ―the validity [of a 
claimant‘s religious beliefs] cannot be questioned,‖ and that such inquiries are 
―foreclosed to [g]overnment.‖33 
Second, courts have granted deference in almost all cases to an employee‘s 
religious views.  Courts will rarely second guess an employee‘s espoused religious 
views.  This trend has been demonstrated in cases where employees either left their 
job completely or refused a job offer due to their alleged religious beliefs, and 
subsequently sought unemployment compensation.  For example, employee 
claimants sought unemployment compensation benefits in this way in the Supreme 
Court cases of Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div.34 and Frazee v. Illinois 
Dep’t of Employment Sec.35  In Thomas, an employee refused to engage in the production 
of armaments and subsequently quit, while the claimant in Frazee refused to accept a 
job assignment where he would be required to work on Sundays.36  In both cases, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the practices at issue violated their religious beliefs.37 
In both cases, the Court found in favor of the employee, and granted the 
sought-after unemployment benefits.38  In Thomas, the Supreme Court overturned a 
lower court‘s ruling that the employee quit on a voluntary basis and was therefore 
not entitled to unemployment compensation.39  The Court rejected such an argument, 
                                                 
32 29 C.F.R § 1605.1 (2007).  The EEOC guidelines provide just that, guidance as to the proper 
interpretation and implementation of Title VII.  However, they are not binding authority, nor do they 
carry regulatory force.  See WOLF, supra note 11, at 3 (providing further information on this point and 
generally on law carrying force in the workplace). 
33 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). 
34 Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
35 Frazee v. Ill. Dep‘t Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
36 Id. at 830; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720. 
37 See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 830 (Frazee was a Christian who refused to work on Sunday, which the 
employment would have required); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710 (Thomas was a Jehovah‘s Witness who 
claimed his religious beliefs prevented his participation in the production of military materials). 
38 Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720. 
39 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. 
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noting that ―the resolution [of what constitutes a religious belief or practice] is not to 
turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; 
religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to 
others . . . .‖40 
In Frazee, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court‘s argument that the 
claimant‘s decision to refuse employment was a personal choice, rather than a 
religious one, simply because the claimant failed to assert his membership or 
association with a given religious sect or institution. 41   Rather, the Court 
unequivocally expressed its ―reject[ion] [of] the notion that to claim the protection . . . 
one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization.‖42  It 
satisfied the Court that the employee‘s claims were ―based on a sincerely held 
religious belief[s],‖ even if not the beliefs of a particular ―organized religious 
denomination.‖43 
Other courts have gone so far as to protect even those expressions of one‘s 
religion that fail to fully comply with the required doctrine of the employee‘s faith.  
For example, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Remedial Educ. & Diagnostic 
Serv., Inc.,44 the wearing of a head covering by a Muslim woman was a protected 
activity despite the fact that the covering failed to satisfy the doctrinal requirements 
of the Islamic faith.45 
The degree to which courts grant deference to an employee‘s religious views 
has also been demonstrated in instances where employees seek haven from a 
particular aspect of their job description, rather than from the employment entirely.  
In McGinnis v. United States Postal Serv.,46 a postal window clerk, in observance of the 
Quaker religion, sought to be excused from having to distribute military draft 
                                                 
40 Id. at 714. 
41 Frazee, 489 U.S. at 831. 
42 Id. at 834. 
43 Id. 
44 759 F. Supp. 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
45 Id. at 1158 n.11 (―The Court credits the statements of [plaintiff] and her Iman that [plaintiff‘s] attire 
does not comply with the requirements of Islam.‖). 
46 512 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
152           TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW        [VOL. 11 
 
registration materials as a part of her job.47  The court granted such protection, 
deeming the preference a type of religious expression. 48   Further, in Haring v. 
Blumenthal,49 an IRS employee was granted legal protection on religious expression 
grounds for refusing to process tax-exemption forms for abortion clinics.50  Thus, 
the trend clearly demonstrates that courts are quick to defer to an employee‘s 
religious views and will rarely second-guess that an asserted practice is a genuine 
religious expression.51 
In addition, courts are slow to question an employee‘s sincerity in claiming 
that a requested accommodation arises out of an expression of their religious 
commitment, as opposed to mere convenience.  This trend ties in closely as an 
extension of the above-mentioned trend – the very low burden of proof required of 
employees by courts as to the sincerity of their religious beliefs.  In the noteworthy 
case Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ.,52 the court noted that a plaintiff‘s burden of 
demonstrating sincerity ―is not a heavy one.‖ 53   Similarly, in Equal Opportunity 
Employment Comm’n v. IBP, Inc., 54  the court held that the employee‘s lack of 
observance of a particular religious practice both before and after the alleged 
religious discriminatory incident was not a sufficient indication of the employee‘s 
lack of sincerity.  Nor do courts deem imperfect adherence to one‘s faith as 
indication of a lack of sincerity.  In Equal Opportunity Employment Comm’n v. Ilona of 
                                                 
47 Id. at 519. 
48 Id. at 520 (―Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that her asserted religious belief is indeed bona 
fide . . . . The Peace Testimony, a central document of the Quaker religion, expressly opposes war and 
militarism of all sorts.‖). 
49 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979). 
50 Id. at 1178, 1184-85. 
51 But see Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff‘s directing employee to type his 
Bible study notes not protected religious expression); McCrory v. Rapides Reg‘l Med. Ctr., 635 F. 
Supp. 975, 979 (W.D. La. 1986) (plaintiff‘s ―right to commit adultery‖ not religious belief subject to 
legal protection); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (plaintiff‘s ―personal religious 
creed‖ causing eating of cat food is merely preference and not protected religious activity); WOLF, 
supra note 11, at 32-34. 
52 757 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1985). 
53 Id. at 482. 
54 824 F. Supp. 147 (C.D. Ill. 1993). 
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Hungary, Inc.,55 the court held that a Jewish employee‘s request for time off of work 
for the religious holiday Yom Kippur was a sincere expression of religious faith 
despite the employee‘s own concession that ―she [was] not a particularly religious 
person and that she [did] not observe every Jewish holiday.‖56 
Thus, as seen from the above cases, courts do not view ―religious sincerity‖ 
as a game of all-or-nothing and are willing to trust an employee‘s sincerity, even if the 
sincerity is piecemeal or in partial observance to the tenets of the employee‘s faith.  
This overarching deference of courts to assertions of employees within the religious 
realm, as well as to the significance of religion, constitutes the most important 
victory for the movement for religious accommodation in the United States 
workplace.  However, despite the considerable progress in the years following the 
initial drafting of Title VII, the movement ultimately stalled, as indicated in a number 
of ways illustrated in the following section. 
III. WHERE THE MOVEMENT FELL SHORT: PITFALLS OF 
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE57 
The movement to secure religious accommodations in the workplace has 
achieved a number of notable victories.  Examples include courts‘ expansive and 
inclusive definition of the term religion, as well as the considerable deference granted 
                                                 
55 108 F.3d 1569 (7th Cir. 1996, modified on rehearing Mar. 6, 1997). 
56 Id. at 1575. 
57 
See generally Laurent Belsie, On The Seventh Day –They Closed Shop, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 
May 4, 1998, at B4.  In contrast to viewing this debate from the perspective of an employee seeking 
accommodation, Goedeker‘s, a St. Louis electronics superstore specializing in home entertainment, 
closes each Sunday for religious reasons.  Id.  Steve Goedeker, owner of Goedeker‘s superstore, 
remarked ―[e]verything can‘t be a business decision . . . [y]ou have to start with a certain set of 
principles.  You make your business decisions around them.‖  Id.  Goedeker closes on Sunday ―partly 
to give employees time with their families; partly for religious reasons.‖  Id.  In regard to Goedeker‘s 
ability to compete in the electronics market, despite its six-day schedule: ―[i]n St. Louis, Goedeker‘s 
battles head-to-head with national retailers Circuit City and Best Buy.‖  Id.  Consider also popular 
restaurant chain Chick-fil-A‘s ―Closed-on-Sunday Policy,‖ available at 
http://truettcathy.com/pdfs/ClosedonSunday.pdf (―[Founder and CEO of Chick-fil-A Truett] 
Cathy‘s practice of closing his restaurants on Sunday is unique to the restaurant business and a 
testament to his faith in God . . . say[ing] two important things to people: One, that there must be 
something special about the way Chick-fil-A people view their spiritual life; and, two, that there must 
be something special about how Chick-fil-A feels about its people.‖ 
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by courts to the religious views of employees.58  However, the movement‘s progress 
slowed in the decades following the drafting of Title VII.  As a result, employees are 
now vulnerable, in certain specific ways, to religious discrimination in the workplace. 
Today, the enforcement of religious discrimination laws in the workplace 
causes a two-pronged disproportion problem.  First, as will be explained, the laws 
disproportionately favor employers over employees.  Second, as elucidated below, 
the laws are more favorable to white-collar professionals than to blue-collar or 
hourly workers.  Therefore, certain groups of employees are left at risk. 
The way the system favors employers over their employees will be addressed 
first.  As noted above, a 1972 amendment to Title VII shed light upon the term 
religion.59  This definition placed a duty upon employers to accommodate religion.  
However, this duty was qualified from its very inception.  According to the definition, 
the duty falls away merely when an employer demonstrates an ―undue hardship‖ that 
would be caused by the accommodation.60 
The undue hardship caveat contained in the definition demonstrates the 
competition between the various applicable burdens of proof in the following way.  
While the definition places a burden on employers to accommodate – an affirmative 
duty – the undue hardship caveat permits the burden to shift back to the employee.  
Although Title VII was intended to empower employees, it has become a double-
edged sword.  Ultimately, the employer‘s blade has proven sharper.  This caveat, 
embodied within the language of Title VII, is the greatest pitfall for employees. 
Generally, every federal circuit in the United States employs a three-prong 
test to evaluate an employee‘s entitlement to religious accommodation: (1) an 
employee must hold a sincere religious belief; (2) an employee must place his or her 
employer on notice as to a conflict between religious observance and job 
responsibilities; and (3) an employee must demonstrate that hardship will come to 
him or her absent the accommodation. 61   If the employee meets this test, an 
                                                 
58 See supra notes 31-56 and accompanying text. 
59 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
60 Id. 
61 See generally Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1996); Cooper v. 
Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1378 (6th Cir. 1994); E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng‘g & Mfg. Co., 859 
F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989)); Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., 797 
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employer is required to provide a reasonable accommodation unless the employer can 
demonstrate an undue hardship resulting from the accommodation.62  By getting the 
last word, so to speak, employers hold considerable leverage over their employees.  So, 
what constitutes an undue hardship?  Any monetary cost, above de minimis, 63  is 
deemed by a court to be an undue hardship.  Therefore, any monetary cost that 
carries any significance can spell victory for an employer and legally permit religious 
discrimination against an employee. 
In the landmark case Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 64  the Supreme 
Court defined undue hardship.  The Court decided that: (1) a monetary loss sufficed; 
and (2) the required showing for an employer was staggeringly low.65  In Trans World 
Airlines, the plaintiff sought time off from his job as a store clerk because of the 
Sabbath.66  The plaintiff had begun adhering to the tenets of the Worldwide Church 
of God, one of which is to refrain from working from sundown Friday through 
sundown Saturday. 67   Consequently, Trans World Airlines (―TWA‖) denied the 
plaintiff‘s request for accommodation, and the plaintiff refused to report to work and 
was subsequently terminated.68  The Court unequivocally ruled in the employer‘s 
favor that ―[t]o require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give 
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.‖69  It should be noted that the Court 
determined that the plaintiff‘s ensuing absence would cause the employer to endure a 
number of varied costs, such as shifting other employees to cover the plaintiff‘s post, 
payment of premium wages, and decreased efficiency as to the plaintiff‘s position or 
other jobs.70 
                                                                                                                                     
F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986); Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R Co., 
736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); WOLF, supra note 12, at 67-68. 
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) (emphasis added). 
63 ―Trifling; minimal . . . (Of a fact or thing) so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an 
issue or case.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004). 
64 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 66-67. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 68-69. 
69 Id. at 84. 
70 Id. 
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The implications of the Trans World Airlines decision are staggering and hold 
grave implications for the religious rights of employees.  As indicated in Trans World 
Airlines, TWA would have suffered a monetary cost of only $150 by accommodating 
Hardison. 71   Such a loss would remain a negligible expense for most employers 
covered by Title VII. 72   If the Court deemed a loss of $150 a hardship to an 
international airline such as TWA, then ―there would seem to be little in the way of 
accommodation costs that would fail to exceed the Supreme Court‘s de minimis 
standard.‖73  The Trans World Airlines decision continues to plague employees in the 
United States.  It is this standard that gives employers a legal edge over their 
employees, ultimately giving them the sharper blade of the double-edged sword.  
Such a standard calls into serious question any progress made in furtherance of the 
movement for religious accommodation in the workplace, leaving employees 
vulnerable in a critical way. 
The Trans World Airlines standard of what constitutes undue hardship benefits 
employers in two ways.  First, the loss of pay disparity favors employers;74 that is, the 
burden that employers must bear pales in comparison to the burden that employees 
must bear.  In Ansonia, the Supreme Court concluded that granting unpaid leave is a 
viable option for employers with employees seeking religious accommodation. 75  
However, in Trans World Airlines, an extremely small monetary burden borne by an 
employer is grounds for claiming undue hardship, and therefore provides the 
employer dispensation from Title VII compliance.76  Thus, while employees can be 
made to accept a significant financial burden, there is virtually no financial burden 
                                                 
71 See id. at 92 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (holding that ―while the stipulations make clear what overtime 
would have cost, the price is far from staggering: $150 for three months, at which time respondent 
would have been eligible to transfer back to his previous department.‖). 
72 See American Airlines, http://www.aa.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).  To provide a frame of 
reference, American Airlines, the airline that acquired Trans World Airlines (―TWA‖) in 2001, 
recorded net earnings of $231 million in 2006 and $504 million in 2007 before experiencing net losses 
in 2008 and 2009 due to global recession and other causes.  For more information on the 2001 
acquisition, as well as yearly company reports, refer to the ―investor relations‖ portion. 
73 WOLF, supra note 11, at 107. 
74 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
75 Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986). 
76 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
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required of employers.  As this disparity indicates, the economic interests of 
employers are significantly favored over employee interests.77 
Second, aside from asserting a financial burden, even a very small one, and 
receiving dispensation from Title VII compliance, employers have another weapon 
in their arsenal with which to assert undue hardship – loss of production.  Even if an 
employer cannot demonstrate financial burden above de minimis, courts are 
receptive to a loss of production argument where the employer demonstrates that 
accommodating an employee‘s religious needs will cause a loss of production.78  This 
allows employers an additional avenue for exemption. 
While employers hold these two weapons – financial loss and production 
loss – employees possess little to defend either charge.  For example, in Cook v. 
Chrysler Corp., 79  an employee sought a religious accommodation for Sabbath 
observance.80  The circuit court affirmed the lower court‘s ruling in favor of the 
employer, and noted that ―absences affect the quality of work because there are 
more repairs than usual and lower efficiency when a floater is used on the line . . . .‖81  
The employee had no recourse in light of these ―significant costs‖ of production loss 
asserted by the employer. 82   Consequently, the current system of religious 
accommodation in the workplace favors employers considerably over their 
employees. 
The second prong of the disproportion problem is that it favors white-collar 
professional employees disproportionately over blue-collar or hourly-wage 
employees.  For purposes of this article, white-collar professional employees 
(―professionals‖) will be used loosely to encompass employees who earn a periodic 
salary rather than an hourly wage.  Professionals tend to work in fields like business, 
accounting, education, politics, and at times as management-level employees who 
                                                 
77 See WOLF, supra note 11, at 90 for additional discussion of this disparity. 
78 See WOLF, supra note 11, at 125 (―Quite apart from the payment of extra wages, the courts have also 
recognized that the use of substitutes, casuals, or transfers may result in other significant costs or 
reductions in efficiency and productivity . . . [and] have tended to accept employer arguments that 
these ‗costs‘ are more than de minimis.‖). 
79 981 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1992). 
80 Id. at 338 
81 Id. at 339. 
82 Id. 
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manage hourly wage earners.  In contrast, blue-collar or hourly wage employees 
(―hourly wage earners‖) include employees who are paid by the hour, earning 
anything from below minimum wage to above. 
Who are hourly wage employees?  These jobs include everything from retail 
and factory jobs to food and janitorial services.  In 2009, 72.6 million American 
workers were hourly wage employees, constituting 58.3 percent of all wage earners.83  
Of those paid by the hour, 3.6 million workers reported earning wages at or below 
minimum wage, accounting for 4.9 percent of all hourly workers.84 
The clash between work and religion often arises in work scheduling. 85  
Employees seek accommodations when working on a given day or working certain 
hours of a given day stands at odds with their religious needs.  For example, an 
employee may request time off on a Saturday or Sunday to observe his or her 
Sabbath.  Or, an employee may request a break from work in the early morning or 
evening for religious prayer time.  It is not hard to see how religious accommodation 
conflicts arise in hourly wage jobs.  In these industries, scheduling is less uniform 
and work is frequently required beyond the traditional 9-5 working day.  For example, 
a commercial janitorial provider may not begin work until after the close of the 
traditional 9-5 working day. 
Scheduling conflicts are less likely to arise in the professional sphere.  
Professional jobs usually operate on an eight-or-nine-hour work day during the five 
weekdays.  This uniformity and predictability precludes most religious scheduling 
conflicts.  In the professional workplace, employees are rarely expected to work on a 
Saturday or Sunday.  In fact, most professional workplaces do not operate on the 
weekend.  Because most professional workplaces close by 5:00 or 6:00 in the evening, 
professional employees rarely would need to request time off in the early morning or 
evening for prayer time. 
                                                 
83 See U.S. Dep‘t of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers: 2009, 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2009.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).  This figure ―refer[s] to 
earnings on a person‘s sole or principal job [and] [a]ll self-employed person are excluded whether or 
not their businesses are incorporated.‖  Id. at n.1. 
84 Id. 
85 The remainder of section III consists largely of the author‘s original analysis, unless otherwise noted 
by citation. 
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Employers tend to contest religious accommodations because of the costs 
borne by employers for hiring replacements and the loss of work production.  These 
issues have a tendency to arise in hourly wage workplaces, but not in professional 
workplaces for the following reasons. 
First, in hourly wage environments, manpower is often at a premium.  In 
factories, retail, food-service, and janitorial work, for example, production is often 
required around the clock.  Therefore, the costs of finding replacements, and the loss 
of production sustained because of the absence of trained workers, become points of 
extreme contention. In the professional workplace, on the other hand, employees are 
typically permitted greater leverage in personal time-management.  This is indicated 
by the fact that many jobs in the professional workplace do not pay by the hour, but 
on a yearly or periodic salary.  Employees are at liberty to leave early, stay late, take 
off on the weekends, or take off during the week and make it up on the weekends, 
when it suits their schedule and work habits.  This is possible so long as the 
employee accomplishes what is expected in the long-term. 
Because of this dynamic, conflicts regarding replacements and loss of 
production are categorically much less likely to arise in the professional sphere.  
When scheduling conflicts occur, replacement employees are rarely called upon to fill 
professional positions.  Instead, professional employees are granted leverage to 
accomplish their work obligations around personal scheduling conflicts as they arise.  
As such, planned absences rarely cause deficiencies in production.  For these reasons, 
hourly wage employees bear the disproportionate brunt of religious conflicts that 
arise in the workplace.  Professional workers will rarely, if ever, confront religious 
discrimination in the ways illustrated above. 
The mere fact that the system currently favors one group over another is 
wrong.  Moreover, the disfavored group happens to be the group least equipped to 
mount a challenge.  Often, hourly wage workers in the categories listed lack the 
academic or professional training that would permit them to rise to the professional 
workplace.86  Otherwise, they may likely do so.  Workers in these categories carry the 
brunt of religious discrimination while being the least equipped to handle it.  More 
specifically, these workers are least equipped to understand and utilize the legal 
                                                 
86  This generalization may apply equally whether such work undertaken represents full-time 
employment or merely part-time employment undertaken while pursuing a degree.  At the time the 
employment is accepted, the worker lacks the skills, training, or credentials for the non-hourly paying 
employment. 
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protections available to them.87  Additionally, these workers may fail to be aware of 
political mechanisms built into our society as a means to achieve change. 
Also, in many cases, workers lack the time to devote to such political 
endeavors.  Many hourly employees work long hours and may work seven days a 
week.  Hourly workers often juggle multiple jobs, preventing them from mobilizing 
their peers to lobby their local politicians or to engage in grassroots activities.  In 
addition, many of these employees are minorities or immigrants that are 
disproportionately harmed by a system initially intended to help them.  These 
employees are most vulnerable to the abuse inadvertently promoted under the 
current system.  It is time to reach out.  The time has come to get the movement 
back on track. 
IV. GETTING THE MOVEMENT BACK ON TRACK 
A number of strategies must be employed to avoid the pitfalls of Title VII.  
Each concurrent strategy aims at repairing another of the shortcomings mentioned 
in the previous section. 
The first step should encompass the legal realm.  The current burden of 
proof by which employers may demonstrate undue hardship is too low.  A higher 
burden must be placed on employers before they can properly demonstrate undue 
hardship.  The current system permits employers to have the last word, which 
prevents employees from voicing the discrimination they face.  An employee seeks 
accommodation by meeting the three-prong test relayed above, and in reply the 
employer need only show undue hardship.88  This should be the end of any discussion.  
Tragically, the employee holds no recourse. 
It is reasonable for courts to cap the loss that an employer is required to bear 
through efforts to accommodate.  However, Congress already defined the cap: undue 
hardship.89  It is not up to the courts to lower this burden.  A virtually negligible 
financial loss is not a hardship at all.  Such a loss is certainly not an undue hardship 
                                                 
87 This would include initiating the process of filing a religious discrimination complaint with the 
EEOC, or merely confronting a potentially discriminating employer. 
88 See supra note 61 and accompanying text for discussion of the three-prong test. 
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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that should vitiate the employer‘s duty to provide a reasonable accommodation.90  
Employers must be forced to bear at least some monetary loss to accommodate an 
employee‘s religious needs.  If an employee must endure an unpaid leave, losing 
100% of earnings, then employers can bear some of that burden too.91  Additionally, 
courts must require employers to demonstrate higher production loss. 92  Also, 
employers should concurrently train and hire enough employees to allow for 
employee substitutes for those employees who are absent because of religious 
reasons.  Loss of production dispensation should be reserved only for extremely 
exceptional circumstances. 
Next, and most importantly, political change must occur.  A political 
mobilization is needed among hourly wage-earning Americans and among lower-
income Americans, who bear the disproportionate brunt of religious discrimination.  
Only those truly affected can properly make the changes necessary to provide 
meaningful religious protection for everyone.  Title VII‘s pitfalls demonstrate that 
those whose employment categorically precludes them from suffering religious 
discrimination are unfortunately ill-equipped to make decisions for those who do 
face such discrimination.  Judges, politicians, and other professional workers suffer a 
disconnect hindering their ability to ensure meaningful safeguards.  Hourly wage 
workers of the United States must mobilize, and through grassroots efforts, 
decisions regarding religious discrimination can be placed back into the hands of 
those truly affected by them.93 
                                                 
90 See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text for discussion of Supreme Court‘s ruling in Trans 
World Airlines. 
91 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text for discussion of the unpaid leave requirement of 
employees. 
92 See supra note 78 and accompanying text for discussion of the production loss dispensation provided 
to employers. 
93 Thankfully, there are organizations trying to help in this way.  Take, for example, the Citizen 
Advocacy Center in suburban Chicago—a non-profit, non-partisan community educational resource 
for ―strengthening the citizenry‘s capacity and motivation to participate in civic affairs, building 
community resources, and improving democratic protocols within our community institutions.‖  
Citizen Advocacy Center, http://www.citizenadvocacycenter. org (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
162           TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW        [VOL. 11 
 
V. THE ACADEMIC WORLD’S TREATMENT OF TITLE VII PITFALLS 
How about the legal academic world?  How would academics – the 
professors, professional students, and traditional students – fare in confronting the 
above related shortcomings of Title VII enforcement?  Would the legal academic 
recognize the disproportionate treatment, in the realm of religious protection, 
afforded to certain other large classes of society?  If so, would meaningful solutions 
be proffered or would the academic world also suffer from the same disconnect as 
shown from the professional world? 
On one hand, professional thinkers in our nation‘s top academic institutions 
are, after all, just professionals.  On the other hand, these professionals are academics, 
equipped with unique abilities and resources and, in many cases, paid to devote their 
professional lives to intellectual pursuit.  Perhaps this would provide the academic 
world with an edge in resolving this puzzle.  For purposes of examining this question, 
poignant works of legal academics from several of our nation‘s top law schools were 
analyzed. 
A number of law review articles evaluated the effectiveness of religious 
protection under Title VII.  These articles also examined the pitfalls of the statute 
from the perspective of the religiously discriminated.  For the purpose of emphasis, 
the articles will be referred to by the institution of authorship, rather than their 
individual author.  First, the publication of an article by an institution entitles the 
institution to a certain degree of ownership.  Second, it is a common practice in legal 
scholarship, as well as case law, to refer to articles in this way.  Finally, an institution 
is quick to claim its students‘ scholarship as its own when such work receives praise.  
These institutions must be given responsibility in the critical response.  Articles were 
reviewed from each of the following prominent universities around the country: 
California, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, and Pittsburgh. 94  The specific titles are 
contained in footnote 94. 
                                                 
94 Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: 
Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575 (2000) [hereinafter ―California‖]; 
Sonny Franklin Miller, Religious Accommodation under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden, 22 J. CORP. L. 789 
(1997) [hereinafter ―Iowa‖]; Alan D. Schuchman, The Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination of the 
Different Applications of the Reasonable-Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73 IND. L.J. 745 
(1998) [hereinafter ―Indiana‖]; Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer’s Duty to Accommodate 
Employee Religious Practices under Title VII After Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 
513 (1989) [hereinafter ―Pittsburgh‖]; Clare Zerangue, Sabbath Observance and the Workplace: Religion 
2010]                     RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE                       163 
 
 
The results of the search were not promising.  No publication identified the specific 
disproportion problem described above, let alone offered any meaningful solutions.  Perhaps the 
results should not be surprising.  Professional academics are professionals.  Their 
schedules, responsibilities, and systems of salary operate in comparable ways to the 
professional world at large.  The disconnect to hourly wage earning Americans 
should be expected just the same. 
Most of the articles offered various solutions to the proffered ills of Title VII.  
However, in each case, the articles called upon professional America to make the 
changes.  For example, Indiana suggested that ―[a] new amendment to Title VII is 
needed,‖ and that ―[a] good starting point would be a repudiation of the current 
Supreme Court doctrine.‖ 95   Additionally, Iowa suggested that ―Congress should 
establish an objective test.‖96  Lastly, California suggested a pair of amendments to 
Title VII, as well as a number of ways for Congress to clarify the title or provide 
guidance toward a more effective application.97 
Louisiana and Pittsburgh chose a more broad-brush approach in evaluating 
the state of the law and omitted solutions to any of the above enumerated 
problems.98  Louisiana went so far as to recognize that ―the outcome in [TWA vs.] 
Hardison severely limited the extent of the accommodation required under [Title 
VII].‖ 99   Rather than taking issue with the disproportionate burden placed on 
employees as a result, Louisiana instead glorified the disparity as a means of ensuring 
that any accommodations made ―will be made within the existing system rather than 
in derogation of it.‖100  Pittsburgh too identified sources of case law under Title VII 
that have ―limit[ed] the employer‘s duty to accommodate employee religious 
                                                                                                                                     
Clause Analysis and Title VII’s Reasonable Accommodation Rule, 46 LA. L. REV. 1265 (1986) [hereinafter 
―Louisiana‖]. 
95 Indiana, supra note 94, at 764. 
96 Iowa, supra note 94, at 813. 
97 California, supra note 94, at 629. 
98 See Pittsburgh, supra note 94; Louisiana, supra note 94. 
99 Louisiana, supra note 94, at 1285. 
100 Id. 
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practices.‖101  Pittsburgh then dropped the ball by proffering that such limits ―do not 
appear to affect the majority of accommodation cases.‖102 
While each article had different approaches and content, each institution 
similarly failed to recognize the disproportion problem.  They failed to connect the 
movement‘s pitfalls with the disproportionate effects on certain large classes of 
society.  Each called upon professional America -- Congress, judges, lawyers, and 
professors – to make changes, but these professionals will categorically, rarely, if ever, 
encounter the discrimination in question.  None of the publications recognized that 
there may be an inherent disconnect suffered by professional America.  The ability to 
implement meaningful change for the hourly wage earning America may very well 
hinge on being able to recognize this disconnect. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
True change cannot occur until those truly affected can be taught how to 
make the change; until hourly wage earning Americans are empowered and educated 
as to how to fight for their rights.  Also, hourly wage earners must learn how to use 
the political and legal instruments of our government to affect change.  This 
education can start in many ways: through federally mandated distribution of 
educational materials in the workplace, federally mandated posting of flyers and 
posters at the water coolers and in the lunchrooms of America‘s factories and 
workplaces, federally mandated employee workshops, or through town-hall meetings 
facilitated by politicians and professionals who care.  However, true change must 
start at the grassroots level. 
Henry Asher caused change.  He stood up.  His courageous voice, after being 
fired from his job because of his religious practices, led to genuine grassroots change.  
In 2005, Henry Asher obtained a civil legal settlement against his employer because 
of its discriminatory practices.103  The settlement called for monetary compensation, 
as well as the establishment of new policies at his former workplace to ensure 
religious accommodation in the future.104  Henry Asher did not have to suffer the 
silent fate of Harry Fischel or countless others because he refused to remain silent.  
                                                 
101 Pittsburgh, supra note 94, at 573. 
102 Id. 
103 See Press Release, supra note 6. 
104 See id. 
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Thanks to the progress of Title VII, others suffering discrimination can have a voice 
too.  But it must start there, from within.  And perhaps from efforts to cause positive 
change – like that of Asher and others like him – we can truly see the dawn of a new 
beginning105 in the way we accommodate religion in the workplace.106 
                                                 
105 How ironic and perhaps telling it is then, that Asher‘s case was filed on Sept. 16, 2004 and settled 
on Oct. 4, 2005 — dates each corresponding to 1 Tishrei in the Hebrew lunar calendar in consecutive 
years.  One Tishrei marks the beginning of Rosh Hashanah — the Jewish New Year. 
106 Asher‘s case now appears as a concrete example in the EEOC Compliance Manual proscribing 
―Blanket Policies [in the workplace] Prohibiting Time Off for Religious Observance‖: 
A large employer operating a fleet of buses had a policy of refusing to accept driver 
applications unless the applicant agreed that he or she was available to be scheduled 
to work any shift, seven days a week. This policy violates Title VII to the extent 
that it discriminates against applicants who refrain from work on certain days for 
religious reasons, by failing to allow for the provision of religious accommodation 
absent undue hardship. 
Compliance Manual § 12–IV (C)(1), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
religion.html#_Toc203359530 (citing Asher‘s case). 
